We propose and develop a model of behavior in threshold public good games. The model draws on learning direction theory and impulse balance theory. We find good support for the model and demonstrate that it can explain the success rates observed in threshold public good experiments. The model is...

We argue that a social norm and the coordination of behavior within social groups can be expressed by a correlated equilibrium. Given a social group structure (a partition of individuals into social groups), we propose four conditions that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent...

Cyber attacks are a growing threat that undoubtedly cause significant loss to individuals. We know, however, surprisingly little about the true economic cost of such attacks. In this paper we estimate the value individuals put on their computer files by eliciting willingness to pay (WTP) and...

The Census is carried in England and Wales every 10 years and gathers information on every household in the population. We conducted a survey two weeks prior to the official census date and measured intention to complete the census. We find that men, the young, and those in rented accommodation...

We explore the extent to which information about the social value orientation (SVO) of group members influences contributions to a public good. We compare four networks of information - empty, pair, star and complete. We find that information about SVO has a significant impact on contributions...

Given that there are significant endogenous effects in trust that cause people to follow trust norms when deciding whether to trust others, trust can be modeled as a super modular game or a game with strategic complementarities in which individuals can converge on either mutual trust or mutual...

We investigate, experimentally, the effects of leadership in a four player weak-link game. A weak-link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to...

Many charities report donations using categories. We question whether such category reporting increases donations in a signalling game where a donor is either generous or not generous. Conditions are derived under which category reporting will increase giving or decrease giving. Category...