This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting … where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk …. Symmetry in education (both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce …

In theory, unilateral divorce laws alter the private incentive to invest in human capital by permitting either spouse … less likely to attain a bachelor's degree in states with unilateral divorce laws--especially individuals who were exposed … to the laws when making educational choices and who live in states requiring an even split of assets upon divorce …

Custody laws governing living arrangements for children following their parents' divorce have changed dramatically …