In this paper, which is a continuation of a previous discrete time paper, we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game...

Outcomes of the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical methods: the...

Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria...

The seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole [Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology, Rev. Econ. Stud., 1985] on how preemption erodes the value of an option to wait raises general questions about the relation between models in discrete and continuous time and thus about...

This paper provides a general characterization of subgame perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investment. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis is based directly on the inherent...

We study a mean-field game framework in which agents expend costly efforts in order to transition into a state where they receive cash flows. As more agents transition into the cash flow receiving state, the magnitude of all remaining cash flows decreases, introducing an element of competition...

In this paper we do a comprehensive analysis of the model of oligopoly with sticky prices with full analysis of behaviour of prices outside its steady state level in the infinite horizon case. An exhaustive proof of optimality is presented in both open loop and closed loop cases

There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race,...

Innovations in consumer products frequently rely on technological advances across multiple tiers in a supply chain. Considering the consumer market demand and downstream investment conditions as input, we model a game in a two-tier supply chain where downstream firms choose to adopt different...

In a continuous-time setting, the existing notion of equilibrium strategies for time-inconsistent problems in the literature, referred to as weak equilibrium, is not fully aligned with the standard definition of equilibrium in the game theory in that the agent may be willing to deviate from a...