This paper examines differences in welfare implications between a free trade area (FTA) and a customs union (CU) for member countries differing in their market sizes. In a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we take into account the conditions that FTA members set external...

This paper shows that when moving from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to a Customs Union (CU), the general equilibrium impacts on Canadian GDP and welfare, of removing Rules of Origin (ROO), are potentially larger than the small effects resulting from the adoption of a common...

The paper develops two synthetic measures at the HS-10 level to depict effective market access for a country receiving preferential access and applies these to the market access ASEAN members would receive on impact following the implementation of an FTA with the EU. These measures reveal quite...

This paper is concerned with rules of origin when intermediate goods are differentiated. An analytical model emphasizes trade patterns and the relative importance of trade in intermediates given trade preferences. Econometric evidence based on intra-OECD trade in motor vehicles and motor vehicle...

This paper identifies the most restrictive limit that rules of origin can enforce and still continue to guarantee gains from trade area formation in general settings. Many commonly used rules of origin exceed this condition in practise. Second, free trade areas generally involve unharmonized...

Most computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies assessing the welfare impact of moving from a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to a deeper form of integration, for example a Customs Union (CU), typically proxy the integration as the adoption of a common external tariff towards the...

With free trade areas (FTAs) under negotiation between Japan and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) members and between the Republic of Korea and AFTA members, preferential market access will become more important in Asian regionalism. Protectionist pressures will likely increase through rules of...

Rules of origin (RoO) are legitimate policy instruments to prevent trade deflection in a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) short of a customs union. Yet, when captured by special interest groups, RoO can restrict trade beyond what is needed to prevent trade deflection. By how much do political...

Striking a balance between trade facilitation and preventing trade deflection is the single most difficult challenge with regard to the issue of rules of origin (ROO). ASEAN ROO is already considered as among the simplest in the world and still, in practice, results fall short of expectations....

Determining origin within the context of international trade is not simple. Rules of Origin (ROOs) would involve laws, regulations and administrative determinations to ascertain a products country of origin which are not costless to comply with. As such, the criteria used to define origin and...