This paper (i) highlights the role that unit subsidies can play in the compensation scheme of a Universal Service Obligation (USO), and (ii) shows that welfare may be reduced when regulation requires accounting separation of network activities for vertically integrated USO providers. This...

Considering a cost reducing innovation, Arrow (1962) shows that a firm in monopoly suffers the replacement effect, that is, its valuation of the innovation is sub-optimal and less than in a context of technological competition. We look also at this problem but within the framework of an economy...

We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives...

This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.

Our paper focuses on the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability in a framework of multimarket contacts. We consider two independent and symmetric markets in which a subset of firms are active in both markets. When firms are able to transfer market power from one...

This paper studies a model of the Internet broadband market as a platform in order to show how different pricing schemes from the so-called net neutrality may increased economic efficiency by allowing more investment of access providers and enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare.

We analyze licensing contracts between informed innovators and developers exerting profit-increasing effort. Those contracts must simultaneously induce innovators to convey information on the value of their ideas, while inducing developers to exert effort and protecting the innovators'...

n order to analyze competition in gas markets, an intermediate activity of storage is included in a classical model of vertical relations. In that case, firms can inject or withdraw strategically natural gas resource. The access to the storage facility can deteriore the welfare since it incites...