It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and hence are pro-competitive. To study the effects of mergers, we rewrite a game with simultaneous price and cost-reducing investment choices as one where firms only choose prices, and make use of...

It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and hence are pro-competitive. To study the effects of mergers, we rewrite a game with simultaneous price and cost-reducing investment choices as one where firms only choose prices, and make use of...

Antitrust authorities regard the possibility of post-merger entry and merger-generated efficiencies as two factors that may counteract the negative effects of horizontal mergers. This paper shows that in differentiated oligopolies with linear demand, all entry-inducing mergers harm consumer...

This paper examines a three-stage model of divisionalization wher, first, two parents firms create independent unts, second, the parents firms allocate cost reducing levels over these units, and third, the resulting uits compete in a Cournot mrket given their current costs of production. The...

This paper examines a three-stage model of divisionalization where, first, two parent firms create independent units, second, the parent firms allocate cost reduction levels over these units, and third, the resulting units compete in a Cournotmarket given their current costs of production. The...

Antitrust authorities view the possibility of entry as a key determinant of whether a proposed merger will be harmful to society. This paper examines the effects of horizontal mergers in models of non-localized, differentiated Bertrand oligopoly that allow for free entry. The analysis of the...