We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise … ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as …

Micro data from a dental insurance natural experiment is used to analyze why agents opt out of insurance. The purpose … show that agents tend to leave the insurance when reclassified into higher premium classes, or when experiencing … unexpectedly low dental care utilization within the insurance. They are more responsive to higher premiums than to lower expected …

The empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed. The problem in assessing the extent of … it difficult to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. Unique micro data, from a dental insurance … insurance makes it possible to observe a proxy for private information. Interestingly, results differ across risk classes …

Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem … point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies remove lossmaking contracts from the market and copy profit making …

We examine equilibria in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in competitive insurance markets when individuals … take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance …

retirement. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we assume that for each period of retirement …