Similar Search Results

Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom - 2020

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer … clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012305849

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

Sequential versus static screening : an equivalence result

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2017

We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626592

Transparency aversion and insurance market equilibria

Gemmo, Irina; Browne, Mark Joseph; Gründl, Helmut - 2017

-subsidizing contracts, the introduction of a transparency contract decreases or even eliminates cross-subsidies. Given the prior existence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011724373

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774

Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach

Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702

Incomplete information and costly signaling in college admissions

Salgado, Alfredo - 2018

reduce the incentive of low-ability students to invest in signaling and increase it for high-ability students. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012166000

Reputation building with endogenous speed of learning

Pei, Harry - 2019

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players' actions. First, when the long-run player's action can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393

Screening by mode of trade

Beccuti, Juan; Möller, Marc - 2019

This paper proposes a mechanism design approach, capable of endogenizing a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment. Allowing for mechanisms that determine the good’s allocation not only at the beginning but also at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131973

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610