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Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2017

In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762788

Employment dynamics in a signaling model with workers' incentives

Weingarden, Alison - 2016

firm's profitability from its employment decisions. I show that the resulting signaling model has pooling equilibria in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709242

On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability

Danau, Daniel; Vinella, Annalisa - 2018

Riordan and Sappington (JET, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent's type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822030

Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063

Signals sell : product lines when consumers differ both in taste for quality and image concern

Friedrichsen, Jana - 2018

This paper analyzes optimal product lines when consumers differ both in their taste for quality and in their desire for social image. The market outcome features partial pooling and product differentiation that is not driven by heterogeneous valuations for quality but by image concerns. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899163

Who should pay for certification?

Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2011

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283658

Output taxation by a revenue-raising government under signaling

Antelo, Manel - Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Government of Andalusia - 2011

analyzed along a two-period signaling model. Each taxpayer privately knows its technological attributes, while third parties … monopoly, signaling is always costly in terms of output deviation and the tax office reacts by setting, a smaller tax in … (asymmetric information) period 1 than it would under symmetric information. In oligopoly, signaling can be either costly or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009415852

Nutrition and signaling in slave markets: a new look at a puzzle within the antebellum puzzle

Craig, Lee A.; Hammond, Robert G. - In: Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and … 7 (2013) 2, pp. 189-206

from a productivity explanation, signaling mattered in the trend of slave heights. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643036

Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets

Lester, Benjamin R. - 2016

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium and then use this characterization to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995843

Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information

Kosenko, Andrew - 2018

We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912599