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Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard

Dilme, Francesc - 2012

idiosyncratic choices (actions done by the current owners). We introduce moral hazard in a dynamic signaling model where … refinements to the incorporation of moral hazard in dynamic signaling that implies uniqueness of equilibria. We find that similar … individual characteristics across types of sellers make everyone worse off, since competition increases signaling waste. Also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170975

Who Should Pay for Certification?

Stahl, Konrad O.; Strausz, Roland - 2011

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178824

A Signaling Model of a Lawyer with Private Information About Her Talent

Xiao, Jean - 2011

analysis employs three versions of a two-type (high or low talent) signaling model of a lawyer with private information about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181829

Heterogeneous Social Preferences, Screening, and Employment Contracts

von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2011

This paper studies a monopsonistic firm's optimal employment contracts if workers have private information on both their propensity for social comparisons and their ability. Employees of the firm are taken to form their own distinct reference group. It is shown that screening workers with equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195101

Delegation and Information Revelation

Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2003

This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques a la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151717

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

Chand, A.K.S; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2016

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153232

Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games

Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - 2013

We introduce a "nestedness" relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game B is nested in game A if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game B. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158276

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals

Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Kempe, David; Tardos, Eva - 2014

We consider common-value hybrid auctions among two asymmetrically informed bidders, where the winning bidder pays his bid with some positive probability k and the losing bid otherwise. Under the assumption of discrete and affiliated signals, we give an explicit characterization of the (unique)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158623

Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions

Dilme, Francesc - 2014

incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … quality of the asset, depending on the cost structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145542

The Informativeness of Signals

Stamland, Tommy - 2001

This paper examines a class of signaling games with multi-dimensional private information to study how the prior, joint …. To illustrate the general problem investigated in this paper, consider the following signaling situation: A corporate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124095