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Information Orders in Screening Problems

Asseyer, Andreas - 2022

This paper studies information orders in screening models with quasilinear preferences. I amend a general screening problem with a public signal about the agent's type and provide robust rankings of signals from the principal's perspective. The principal prefers one signal to another for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014078440

Screening Mechanism When Online Users Have Privacy Concerns

Jacob, Jagan - 2019

In consumer-to-consumer online platforms that enable selling (e.g., eBay, Taobao) or sharing (e.g., Airbnb, Uber) of goods and services, information asymmetry between providers (e.g., sellers, hosts, drivers) and consumers (e.g., buyers, guests, passengers) pose challenges. Such platforms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106726

Buyer Coalitions Against Monopolistic Screening : On the Role Of Asymetric Information Among Buyers

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - 2002

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individual self-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate the goods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takes into account both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112806

Hiding Information in Electoral Competition

Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - 2002

We model a two-candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy-relevant state of the world. The candidates receive private signals about the true state, which are imperfectly correlated. We study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114607

Signals, Screens, and Spin : The Use of Information and Misinformation to Reduce Violent Activism

Stamland, Tommy; Shogren, Jason F. - 2004

. We examine how this violent signaling may be countered and reduced by the use of information-gathering mechanisms …. Signaling through violent activism does not necessarily fully reveal an activist's true intentions. A signal is only partially …-gathering mechanisms are used in succession: signaling, screening, and spin control. The signaling is only partially separating so a role …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118712

Ratings, Certifications and Grades : Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2005

We consider the effect a public revelation of information (e.g. rating, grade) has on signaling and trading in a … allows for signaling in equilibrium. More interestingly, we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices. If the signal is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027801

Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling

Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom - 2022

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082600

Bayesian Persuasion by an Informed Mechanism Designer

Zhang, Jun; Chen, Yanlin - 2022

We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529

Activist manipulation dynamics

Cetemen, Esat Doruk; Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron; … - 2022

Two activists with correlated private positions in a firm's stock, trade sequentially before simultaneously exerting effort that determines the firm's value. We document the existence of a novel linear equilibrium in which an activist's trades have positive sensitivity to her block size, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013363647

Informed Principal and Screening Problem

Kim, Bara; Yoo, Seung Han - 2022

This paper studies an informed mechanism designer problem in which the principal’s private information is a number of agents. We define mechanical equivalence such that it holds if each agent’s and the principal’s perspectives are consistent in the sense that a conversion problem for a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013404832