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Securitization is not that evil after all
Albertazzi, Ugo; Eramo, Ginette; Gambacorta, Leonardo; … - Banca d'Italia - 2011
selling less opaque loans, using signaling devices (i.e. retaining a share of the equity tranche of the ABSs issued by the SPV …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867443
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Noisy Signaling in Monopoly
Mirman, Leonard J.; Salgueiro, Egas; Santugini, Marc - Institut d'Économie Appliquée, HEC Montréal (École … - 2011
We study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876408
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The Simple Analytics of Price Signaling Quality
Mirman, Leonard J.; Santugini, Marc - Institut d'Économie Appliquée, HEC Montréal (École … - 2011
We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876409
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Who Should Pay for Certification?
Stahl, Konrad O.; Strausz, Roland - CESifo - 2011
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853867
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Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana P. - In: Journal of Economics and Econometrics 56 (2013) 2, pp. 1-24
´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011078543
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Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana P. - In: Journal of Economics and Econometrics 56 (2013) 2, pp. 25-53
The present paper aims at explaining strike incidence, measured by the proportion of strikers observed in each sector, and strike severeness, proxied by a measure of mean strike hours lost per worker in each industry. We find that Industry concentration dissuades striking – more concentrated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011078559
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Investment busts, reputation, and the temptation to blend in with the crowd
Grenadier, Steven R.; Malenko, Andrey; Strebulaev, Ilya A. - In: Journal of Financial Economics 111 (2014) 1, pp. 137-157
We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to signal quality. When a public common shock forces abandonment of a small fraction of projects irrespective of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039201
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Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
Vareda, João - Autoridade de Concorrência, Government of Portugal - 2007
We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant?s decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115551
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Signaling Rather than Incentive Mechanism for Entry Regulation
Kim, Jaehong - Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University - 2001
information can be better than that under complete information, if the government uses signaling mechanism rather than incentive … mechanism. The main difference between screening and signaling is who initiates information transmission process. Contrary to … the incentive mechanism for the optimal price regulation, the signaling mechanism induces the regulated firm to deviate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574144
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Who Should Pay for Certification?
Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer --- the seller --- follows from a non--trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer--induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854541