Showing 41 - 50 of 57
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664079
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014249192
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072456
This paper considers a theoretical model of n asymmetric firms that reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities. In accordance with Schumpeterian hypotheses we obtain that more efficient (bigger) firms spend more in R&D and this leads to a more concentrated market structure. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073383
We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel and the fringe. We consider two different approaches to collusion: (i) one-stage static model and (ii) a multi-period oligopoly model. Our main result is that in the static model with quantity-setting firms a stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008564421
This note shows that the profitability of a merger between a leader and a follower in a Stackelberg market crucially depends on the degree of collusion among leaders. When leaders cut production in order to raise the price, followers have lower incentives to merge with the leaders since by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715444
We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or in a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827747
We analyze how the size of a cartel affects the possibility to sustain a collusive agreement. We develop a multi-period oligopoly model with homogeneous, quantity-setting firms, a subset of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe) firms choose their output levels...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690077
We analyze horizontal mergers in a collusive environment by using an infinitely repeated game where (i) a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given and (ii) partially collusive arrangements are allowed for. We show that, in our model, there is no clear relation between the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499749