We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank...

This paper considers a theoretical model of n asymmetric firms that reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities. In accordance with the Schumpeterian hypotheses, more efficient (bigger) firms spend more on R&D and this leads to a more concentrated market structure. This calls...

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank...

In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may...

type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>We discuss the effects of the existence of non-colluding (fringe) firms on cartel sustainability. We obtain, using trigger strategies, that with product differentiation collusion is always more easily sustained when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in...</p>

We analyze risk taking behavior of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilize unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank...