This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998). Delegation trades-off the cost of having a possibly incompetent...

This paper reexamines the Phillips and Beveridge curves to explain the inflation surge in the U.S. during the 2020s. We argue that the pre-surge consensus regarding both curves requires substantial revision. We propose that the Inverse-L (INV-L) New Keynesian Phillips Curve replace the standard...

We propose a simple theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution and then analyze under what conditions delegation is optimal for society. Our theory builds on Holmstrom's (1982, 1999) "hidden effort"...