We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In … alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is oÞered but not purchased. -- Asymmetric Information ; Regret ; Insurance … positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse …

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand … dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamiccontract has insurance companies offeringcontracts where the terms of the contract … on individualpast performance (like in car insurances). Weinvestigate whether allowing insurance companies to offer …

to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version … of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer … a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to solve this major …

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambiguity about the … accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We also present an example where an … constraint and allows low risks to buy more insurance. Higher ambiguity also deteriorates the low risks' expected utility from …

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech …

We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In … positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse … selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance …

beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical … contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review begins with the role of utility, risk, and risk aversion in the … insurance literature and then summarizes work on the demand for insurance, insurance and resource allocation, moral hazard, and …

to a catastrophe. Distinct from the existing literature on insurance cycles, we model optimal contracting by competitive … insurance cycle …

contractual relationships within a competitive context. We also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such … asymmetric information in the French market for automobile insurance. Using various parametric and nonparametric methods, we find …