We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based...

In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...

Since 2009, the European Commission requires firms to incorporate an array of new elements into CEO compensation contracts, such as bonus caps, claw back provisions, bonus deferral, performance-vesting, and minimum shareholding guidelines. This paper examines whether CEO contract design in line...

Unlike the failure of a non-financial firm, the failure of a systemically important financial firm will reduce the value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of an increased level of systemic risk. Thus diversified shareholders of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk...

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence...