In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model developed in previous papers (see Bofinger, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser 2002) to a monetary union. For a similar approach see (Uhlig 2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union...

In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model to a monetary union. For a similar approach see Uhlig (2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation structure of shocks that hit the currency...

In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model developed in previous papers (see Bofinger, Mayer, and Wollmershauser 2002) to a monetary union. For a similar approach see (Uhlig 2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union...

In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model developed in previous papers (see Bofinger, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser 2002) to a monetary union. For a similar approach see (Uhlig 2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union...

In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model to a monetary union. For a similar approach see Uhlig (2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation structure of shocks that hit the currency...

In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model to a monetary union. For a similar approach see Uhlig (2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation structure of shocks that hit the currency...

In this Paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macromodel a la Clarida Gali Gertler (1999) to a monetary union. We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a...

This Paper outlines some issues regarding the interaction of independent fiscal authorities and one central bank in the European monetary union. It points out the possibilities for coordination failures, ranging everywhere from potentially excessive deficits and free-riding problems to...

We investigate what happens when the fiscal authorities do not react to rising public debt so that the unpleasant task of fiscal sustainability falls upon the Central Bank (CB). In particular, we explore whether the CB's bond purchases in the secondary market can restore stability and...

The Friedman rule states that steady-state welfare is maximized when there is deflation at the real rate of interest. Recent work by Khan et al (2003) uses a richer model but still finds deflation optimal. In an otherwise standard new Keynesian model we show that, if households have hyperbolic...