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This article examines working conditions in the RMG sector of Bangladesh could improve through effective monitoring system. In a significant case Nike suggested that working conditions and labour rights can be improved through a systematic approach and a comprehensive and transparent monitoring...
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We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293373
Zahlreiche Studien weisen auf hohe Misserfolgsquoten von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen hin, messen dies jedoch vor allem anhand finanzieller Indikatoren, während eine mitarbeiterbezogene Betrachtung unterbleibt. Kritisch wird die Situation, wenn hochqualifizierte, aber unzufriedene...
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Die Studie präsentiert die Ergebnisse der 10. HR-Expertenbefragung mit der Zeitschrift Personalwirtschaft über ausgewählte Teilaspekte des Internationalen Personalmanagements. Themenschwerpunkte sind u.a. die Strategien zur personalpolitischen Steuerung von Auslandsstandorten,...
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This paper introduces a new data source available for HRM researchers and personnel economists, the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP). The LPP is a longitudinal and representative employer-employee data set covering establishments in Germany and designed for quantitative empirical HR research. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419536
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325934