We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...

Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. From a theoretical perspective, however, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and...

Summary Transaction costs are an obstacle to the efficient operation of selective contracting. Health care delivery systems (§140 a-d SGB V) and selective contracting between networks of service providers and purchasers are advocated as an effective method to improve the performance of the...

Local labor markets are characterized by rigidities in their patterns of adjustment to short-run fluctuations. With or without unions, fluctuations in employment, hours worked, and money wages are unlike the patterns predicted by conventional discrete-exchange labor-market theories. Moreover...

Published by Asociación de Economistas Agrarios de Chile

This dissertation considers three topics in professional advising and forecasting. Chapter 1 examines a principal's optimal contracting with experts. In an environment where experts have heterogeneous private signal distributions and type dependent reservation utilities, we show that the...

Die Arbeit besch?ftigt sich mit der optimalen Vertragsgestaltung zwischen Krankenversicherern und Leistungserbringern. Ausgehend von verschiedenen Aspekten der Vertragstheorie erfolgt eine Spezifikation auf die Besonderheiten des Gesundheitswesens. Der Fokus liegt einerseits auf einer...

We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...

In Germany, free collective bargaining was introduced after the Great War in November 1918. Tough, it has constitutional status, we can observe that the state monitors and sometimes steers the collective bargaining process. This can be explained by using the Principal Agent Model as an...

We investigate the optimal regulation of energy production reflecting the long-term goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. We analyze the optimal regulatory incentives to foster the development of non-emissive electricity generation when the demand for power is served either by a monopoly or by...