The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agree- ments (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of re- location of...

Do reductions in capital income taxes attract foreign capital and, at the same time, foster economic growth? This paper examines the effect of capital income taxation on the international allocation of capital and on economic growth in a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous...

This paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets sovereign national governments. Taxation of mobile capital and immobile labor in order to finance a public good generates inefficient fiscal competition. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a...

Consider an overlapping generation growth model involving identical countries whose fiscal policy reduces to a pay-as-you-go system with flat rate benefits and uniform payroll tax rate. In autarky, the tax rate is chosen so as to achieve a compromise between intragenerational and...

This paper addresses the issue of capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of countries. Countries are allowed to be asymmetric not only in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per inhabitant. National governmentstax capital and labor in order to finance a...

We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed...

This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other for mobile factors by using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. We use a panel dataset of 20 OECD countries over the 1982-2000 period. There is evidence that international capital inflows (FDI) are affected by...

We provide a quantitative assessment of the welfare cost of tax competition or, equivalently, the welfare benefit of international tax policy cooperation. We use a simple multi-country general equilibrium model of a world economy, in which there are two types of cross-country spillovers: the...

This Paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The consequences of capital market liberalization to national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analysed. A...

This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree of mobility of private capital across jurisdictions boundaries is perfect. The optimal tax on mobile capital is a source tax that taxes away factor rents. Further we show that taxation of mobile...