Sender conveys scarce information to a number of receivers to maximize the sum of receiver payoffs. Each receiver … regularity conditions, we show that the payoff of each receiver is convex in the amount of information she receives. Thus, it is … optimal for Sender to target information to a single receiver. We then study four extensions in which interior information …

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct … revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of … transmitting information have very different consequences. Since the objectives of the Central Bank and those of individual …

The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non- trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and … standard information structures with strong properties of knowledge. …

generalized notion of) choice structure in terms of belief revision by adding: (1) the possibility that an item of ''information …'' might be discarded as not credible (thus dropping the AGM success axiom) and (2) the possibility that an item of information …, while not accepted as fully credible, may still be ''taken seriously'' (we call such items of information ''allowable''). We …

strongly to predictable marginal cost changes, as expected from the Mankiw and Reis (2002) Sticky Information Model. We find …