In this paper we claim that the disadvantage in the pollution control is not primarily the accumulated stock of pollutants, which is an accomplished fact, but the use of the available inputs in production in conjunction with the available equipment are the sources of pollutants accumulation. In...

In this note we generalize a numerical algorithm presented in [9] to calculate all solutions of the scalar algebraic Riccati equations that play an important role in finding feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar N-player linear affine-quadratic differential game. The algorithm is based on...

Main objects here are normal-form games, featuring uncertainty and noncooperative players who entertain local visions, form local approximations, and hesitate in making large, swift adjustments. For the purpose of reaching Nash equilibrium, or learning such play, we advocate and illustrate an...

In this paper we present a new class of pedestrian crowd models based on the mean field games theory introduced by Lasry and Lions in 2006. This macroscopic approach is based on a microscopic model, that considers smart pedestrians who rationally interact and anticipate the future. This leads...

We propose a meta-heuristic approach for solving nonlinear dynamic tracking games. In contrast to more "traditional" methods based on linear-quadratic (LQ) techniques, this derivative-free method is very flexible (e.g. to introduce inequality constraints). The meta-heuristic is applied to a...

We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection mechanism. Following Young's papers, we call a state stochastically stable if its long-term relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases...

This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit...

With non-controllable auto-regressive shocks, the welfare of Ramsey optimal policy is the solution of a single Riccati equation of a linear quadratic regulator. The existing theory by Hansen and Sargent (2007) refers to an additional Sylvester equation but miss another equation for computing the...

In monopoly pricing situations, firms should optimally vary prices to learn demand. The variation must be sufficiently high to ensure complete learning. In competitive situations, however, varying prices provides information to competitors and may reduce the value of learning. Such situations...

The paper considers a class of decision problems with in_nite time horizon that contains Markov decision problems as an important special case. Our interest concerns the case where the decision maker cannot commit himself to his future action choices. We model the decision maker as consisting of...