Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). It is well known that if there are only two agents then any such mechanism must have a threshold (or...

We build an oligopoly model of the market of scientific journals that allows us to relate the (in-)efficiency of this market to the exogenous distribution of article quality. Journal quality is endogenously determined by the submission choices of scientists. The efficiency of any stable...

We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Renegotiation-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively...

We collect data of one-shot play for a representative selection of two by two games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions, to compare the predictive power of theories of one-shot play ``out of treatment:'' competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different...

We design and implement lab experiments, as close as possible to the Ellsberg two-color urn experiment, to evaluate the positive and normative appeal of behavior arising from models of ambiguity-averse preferences. We report three main empirical findings: First, these preference models do not...

If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty a la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom of...

In the unique attainable equilibrium of a voting model with one minority candidate and two similarly appealing majority candidates, majority voters are unable to coordinate their support and the minority candidate (Condorcet loser) is elected. Suppose a random sample of voters is asked about...

We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself...