Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We perform two robustness checks of this result. First, we show that only the...

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...

A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payoff associated to each alternative, and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payoffs...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players $n$, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every $n$-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient...

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of...

I study the implications of Abraham Wald's (1947) complete class theorem for decision making under Knightian uncertainty (or ambiguity). Suppose we call someone who uses Wald's approach to statistical decision making a Waldian. A Waldian may then have preferences over acts that are not in...

We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Renegotiation-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively...

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex-ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to secretly learn their opponent's preferences. We show that there is an interval with an upper bound...

Ambiguity averse decision-makers can behave in financial portfolio problems in ways that cannot be rationalized as subjective expected utility maximization. Indeed, [Dow and da Costa Werlang, Econometrica 1992] show that an ambiguity-averse decision-maker might abstain from trading an asset for...