committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also …

attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated …

attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated …

Theory predicts that committees of experts may take decisions that look good but are bad and that they show a united … front to impress evaluators. Although evaluators see through this behavior, committees persist in it only to avoid worse … assessments. We investigate this theory in the lab, using treatments with and without reputation concerns and with and without …

priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of …

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known … heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees of strategic communication. We use a 2 x 2 design varying the information … protocol (communication vs exogenous public signals) and the group composition (heterogeneous vs homogeneous). Results are only …

disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. An example is FDA committees, where committee members can … standard voting model, we show that information is aggregated in large committees provided disesteem payoffs are not overly …, information aggregation fails in large committees and the committee rejects the innovation almost surely, providing an explanation …

We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a … aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely. …