This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</I> (2008), volume 66, pages 243-250.<P> We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and...</p></i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</I> (2010). Vol. 166, issue 2, pages 286-298. <P> A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a...</p></i>

We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...

This paper studies the relation between optimal dam capacity and water management under rivalry uses and externalities. We extend the hydropower generation model, based on Haddad (2011), by including the competing use of water resource, non-linear building cost of dam capacity and externalities...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

I examine a search model a la' Burdett and Judd (1983). Consumers are embedded in a consumers network, they may costly search for price quotations and the information gathered are non-excludable along direct links. This allows me to explore the effect of endogenous consumers externalities on...