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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255930
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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Institute - 2005
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144400
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Lobbying on entry
Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338011
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The political economy of financial fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2005
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325212
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In- cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137200
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico C; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662100
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The political economy of financial systems
Haber, Stephen H.; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
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The Political Economy of Financial Systems
Haber, Stephen; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255875