Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.

The 2008/2009 global crisis highlighted the vulnerabilities and inter-dependencies in the financial system including the global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, where significant counterparty credit risk prevails. In this paper, we deal with risk under Basel III banking regulation and...

This article presents a financial scoring model estimated on Czech corporate accounting data. Seven financial indicators capable of explaining business failure at a 1-year prediction horizon are identified. Using the model estimated in this way, an aggregate indicator of the creditworthiness of...

This study aims to analyse the sensitivity of capital requirements to changes in risk parameters (PD, LGD and M) by creating a model bank with a portfolio mirroring the average asset composition of internationally active large banks, as well as locally oriented smaller institutions participating...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...

This paper deals with the relation between excessive risk taking and capital structure in banks. Examining a quarterly dataset of U.S. banks between 1993 and 2010, we find that equity is valued higher when more risky portfolios are chosen when leverage is high, and that more risk taking has a...

This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

The industrial organization approach to banking is extended to analyze the effects of interbank market activity and regulatory liquidity requirements on bank behavior. A multi-stage decision situation allows for considering the interaction between credit risk and liquidity risk of banks. This...

We construct a new systemic risk measure that quantifies vulnerability to fire-sale spillovers using detailed regulatory balance sheet data for U.S. commercial banks and repo market data for broker-dealers. Even for moderate shocks in normal times, fire-sale externalities can be substantial. For...