Similar Search Results

Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - 2000

reduce deterrence and are thus worth discouraging. Optimal penalties for bribery and framing are maximal, but, surprisingly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175337

Law Enforcement Using Imprisonment

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 2003

This essay is a new chapter in An Introduction to Law and Economics (Third Edition, forthcoming 2003). It discusses how the state should determine the length of a jail term to impose on an individual if he has committed a crime and how much to spend on trying to catch criminals. The analysis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082284

International Criminal Law : An Ideology Critique

Krever, Tor - 2013

ICL and its adequacy to deal with conflict and violence ignores the factors and forces — including specific international … conflict and violence emanates. In uncritically celebrating ICL and equating it with a pacific international rule of law, ICL … systemic forces underlying instances of violence, including political-economic forces shaped by international legal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082385

Abandoned Criminal Attempts : An Economic Analysis

Mungan, Murat C. - 2016

An attempt is 'abandoned' if the criminal, despite having a chance to continue with his criminal plan, forgoes the opportunity to do so. A regime that makes abandonment a defense to criminal attempts provides an incentive to the offender to withdraw from his criminal conduct prior to completing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152434

Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect

Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - 2016

Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. This is possible because, when parties comply, the punishment is not applied and can thus be used to support a new threat. We refer to this feature of sticks as the "multiplication effect". The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222949

Incentive Contracts, Optimal Penalties and Enforcement

Gans, Joshua S. - 2000

This paper re-examines the literature on optimal penalties and the allocation of resources to enforcement from the … enforcement and to impose penalties on both principal and agent if that is feasible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014156937

Swiftness and delay of punishment

Dušek, Libor; Traxler, Christian - 2024

This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014464145

Swiftness and delay of punishment

Dušek, Libor; Traxler, Christian - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014457716

Juvenile Crime and Anticipated Punishment

Arora, Ashna - 2019

Are juvenile offenders deterred by criminal sanctions? Existing research indicates that they are not, as offending decreases only marginally when individuals cross the age of criminal majority and begin to face harsher, adult-level sanctions. Dynamic models of criminal behavior predict, however,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900338

Crime, Punishment, and Legal Error : A Review of the Experimental Literature

Zeiler, Kathryn - 2018

When individuals violate the law, detection and verification of the violation are rarely, if ever, perfect. Before the state can dole out punishment, it must first identify a suspect and then produce sufficient evidence to persuade a judge and/or jury beyond some threshold level of confidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911126