We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

Funeral Aid Associations (FAAs) in Northeast Thailand offer micro funeral insurance at affordable premium levels while … the insurance. Compared to many other micro insurance schemes, however, FAAs do not seem to face adverse effects of this … of a sufficient number of low-risk individuals, who deliberately buy insurance despite what their risk types would advice …

beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical … contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review begins with the role of utility, risk, and risk aversion in the … insurance literature and summarizes work on the demand for insurance, insurance and resource allocation, moral hazard, and …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals' demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers' beliefs and hence seems to be taste-based. When possible … towards ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination. …

a disease (a discrimination risk). Differently, Consent Law allows them to hide this detrimental information, creating …

discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an …

discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an …

a disease (a discrimination risk). Differently, Consent Law allows them to hide this detrimental information, creating …

discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an …