risk by overrating the agent's performance. Second, I show that by screening for one supervisor type, firms can incentivize … the supervisor to truthfully report performance at the lowest possible costs. For this reason, screening may be optimal … end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the …

risk by overrating the agent's performance. Second, I show that by screening for one supervisor type, firms can incentivize … the supervisor to truthfully report performance at the lowest possible costs. For this reason, screening may be optimal … end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we … develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other …. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward … each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we … develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other …. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find …

We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This … is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can … be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …