This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor and the contractor sign the contract, the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I show how to include...

Corruption is widely spread across the world and is believed to affect economic growth negatively. It is most persistent in the developing countries. Russian economy is not an exception. Significant losses are also reported in public procurement in Russia due to corruption. Unfortunately, to...

The paper presents a theoretical model with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of an economy. In such an economy given its perception about the extent of leakage the government sets the price of public services required for entrepreneurship by maximizing the welfare of the...

The aim of this paper is to reveal whether there is a relation between public procurement and the election cycle in Prague. The examined data cover the period from 2005 to 2011. Two hypotheses have been set in order to discover whether there is such a relation. The first one postulates that...

This article examines for the first time the relationship between transparency of ownership structure and (i) profits of firms winning public procurement contracts and (ii) competition for the contracts and savings of the public authority. These characteristics are compared for two groups of...

The paper studies the impact of corruption threat in procurement an dpublic purchases. It explores the consequences of the unobservability of people integrity and considers the problem of both capture and extortion. It shows that extortion is not fight against because it is not harmful to the...

The European Commission co-funds public projects through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) to stimulate the sustainable economic development of EU Member States. The ESIF budget is about 90 billion euros annually and ESIF beneficiaries are explicitly encouraged to increase...

This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional...

In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be...

This paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first price, sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium concept and estimate the structural parameters of the bidders'...