Showing 101 - 110 of 225
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009384113
How can a manager influence workers' activity while knowing little about it? This paper examines a situation where production requires several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve a preferred allocation of effort across tasks. However, the effort that is required for each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747349
How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747379
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003749826
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410683
This article considers a wide class of censoring problems and presents a construction rule for an objective function. This objective function generalises the ordinary likelihood as well as particular ?likelihoods? used for estimation in several censoring models. Under regularity conditions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261568
In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reflect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261576
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003114944
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001828786