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Career concerns and incentive compatible task design

Aoyagi, Masaki; Menuet, Maxime - 2024

This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent's talent when it consists of two components. The agent observes the first component of his talent as his private type, and reports it to a principal to perform a task which reveals the second component of his talent. Based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046363

Information feedback in a dynamic tournament

Aoyagi, Masaki (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

. -- tournament ; mechanism ; information revelation ; Jensen’s inequality …This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents’ effort in each …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001763125

Achieving the first best in sequencing problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001573554

Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Loginova, Oksana; Wang, Xinghe Henry; Lu, Haibin - 2010

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective …. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal … and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194982

Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts

Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2005

The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and indendent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends on the productivity of the agents,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027830

Achieving the first best in sequencing problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - 2000 - Revised

In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538720

Expected Informativeness of Performance Measures and Incentives

Kim, Min S. - 2018

This paper proposes "expected informativeness," an ex-ante counterpart of a likelihood ratio, in principal-agent models. The principal has an easy task and a difficult task to delegate. The difficult task requires high ability and high effort. It is the first-best outcome to assign tasks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930403

Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057288

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2004

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261280