The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that receivers hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous...

I study experimental markets in which sellers interact with buyers who have biased beliefs about the characteristics of the product that is being sold. I examine whether such buyers can be exploited by sellers through the use of specifically designed pricing structures, as suggested by recent...

We experimentally investigate the strategic interaction between a product expert and a consumer. The expert privately chooses a ranking methodology to rank two products with uncertain relative merits; the consumer decides whether to acquire the resulting ranking report to guide her product...

We analyze corporate tax avoidance in a theoretical model and in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting in which symmetric firms and consumers sell and buy a homogeneous product, when human participants make decisions as firms and consumers. We investigate how market power and information...

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in...