Showing 151 - 159 of 159
Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo- lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies...
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We consider collective choice from two alternatives. Ex-ante, each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers, and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences. An environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and...
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The existence of a linear equilibrium in Kyle's model of market making with multiple, symmetrically informed strategic traders is implied for any number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the underlying exogenous random variables is elliptical. The reverse implication has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366548
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator' a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366547
We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489977
We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538847
This dissertation examines a natural signaling mechanism in a two-sided matching market between firms and workers. We consider a basic game of incomplete information. Each agent knows her own preferences over matches, but uncertain about other agent preferences. Each worker can send a limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009449999