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Shapley-Value Parables of Corporations as Evolutive Systems of Associational Cognition
Aoki, Masahiko - 2012
Instead of taking the orthodox view of business corporations as nexuses of contracts as a basic premise, this article focuses on their aspect as “incorporating” autonomous systems of associational (group-level) cognition for business objectives. In order for such a system to be consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112803
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Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias : The Role of Concavity
Tanner, Noam - 2019
A principal is uncertain of an agent's preferences and cannot provide monetary transfers. The principal, however, does control the discretion granted to the agent. In this paper, we provide a simple characterization of when it is optimal for the principal to screen by offering different terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894211
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Towards a Cross-Disciplinary and Contextual Contract Theory
Goorha, Prateek - 2018
The paper proposes a method for introducing ‘context' within the contractual environment based on a simple application of intuitive control theory. A market-based contractual space is framed within the larger formal institutional space and an even larger cultural space – the spaces together...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935562
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Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency
Cato, Susumu - 2017
This study investigates the effects of transparency in a sequential moral hazard problem, where a leader and a follower consecutively take an action. The principal chooses whether the organization is transparent or opaque, by which we mean that the action of the leader is observable to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971291
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Teams in Relational Contracts
Kvaloy, Ola - 2016
size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the … agents' incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. We also show that … more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's effort incentives, in particular if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977358
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Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
Chi, Chang-Koo - 2018
This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not, the optimal bonus scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920164
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Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts
Kvaloy, Ola - 2014
This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts between a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate output can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the optimal contract under (a) is a team incentive scheme where each agent is paid a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060801
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Herbert Simon: bounded rationality y teoría de las organizaciones
Estrada, Fernando - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This article evaluates Herbert A. Simon’s contribution to organization theory, placing special emphasis on the criterion of bounded rationality. Simon’s criticism of the orthodox version of organizational bureaucracy is interpreted and his analysis is extended to institutional economics. One...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260227
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Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - Institutt for foretaksøkonomi, Norges Handelshøyskole … - 2013
This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts between a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate output can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the optimal contract under (a) is a team incentive scheme where each agent is paid a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732445
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Balanced Scorecards : A Relational Contract Approach
Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2020
) specification, the efficiency of the contract improves with higher precision of the index measure, since this strengthens incentives … verifiable performance measures in the relational index contract in order to improve incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032096