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down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification …Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in separation from top … prevents unraveling so that equilibria with full separation do not exist. This note shows that, if one considers the buyers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985597
down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification …Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in separation from top … prevents unraveling so that equilibria with full separation do not exist. This note shows that, if one considers the buyers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543010
It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427598
It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411261
strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices … that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343969
This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only … certification service. It is true that in such an equilibrium having a certificate is better than not. The exact value of a … accounting shows that the monopolistic certifier's profit maximizing conduct can lead to under or over supply of certification …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722369
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720706
We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality … certification policy, which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold, does not … restrict the firms' quality choice. In contrast to an MQS, certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014163570
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence seller-induced certification acts as a signalling device. Seller …-induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975228
This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408008