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Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems : theory and experimental evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365864
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Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892
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Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932
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Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358
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Performance appraisals and the impact of forced distribution: An experimental investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269805
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Performance appraisals and the impact of forced distribution : an experimental investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in … distribution ; motivation ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981608
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Feedback in Tournaments Under Commitment Problems : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2021
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316760
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Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution : An Experimental Investigation
Berger, Johannes - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141429
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Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231
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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008
-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056862