Showing 551 - 558 of 558
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430342
We develop a model to analyze the determinants and effects of an endogenous imperfect transferability of human capital on natives and immigrants. The model reveals that high migration flows and high skill-transferability are mutually interdependent. Moreover, we show that high mobility within a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004956599
In models of certification possible restrictions on the nature of the fee structures are commonly analyzed. We show that they are irrelevant for the certifier's ability to maximize profits and trade efficiency. Our results establish that certification schemes involve two substitutable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284745
We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends on whether the agent's (verifiable) presentation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014445155
We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when a principal needs information from an agent to implement an action. Assuming a strong form of limited commitment, the principal may employ a mediator who gathers information and makes non-binding proposals. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366573
We develop a model to show that cartels that produce goods with lower durability are easier to sustain implicitly. This observation gen- erates the following results: 1) implicit cartels have an incentive to pro- duce goods with an inefficiently low level of durability; 2) a monopoly or explicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343926
This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996
Abstract We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy—the principal, the prime‐agent and the subagent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime‐agent, who receives a report from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015100693