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Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619

Quality Infomediation in Search Markets

Kennes, John R.; Schiff, Aaron - 2007

We examine the effects of informational intermediation by a third party 'infomediary' in a search model with heterogeneous seller qualities and asymmetric information. The infomediary earns revenue by selling a list of accredited sellers (a 'guidebook') to buyers and selling accreditations to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057918

Screening with Congestion

Agbo, Maxime - 2014

We study the effect of congestion on monopoly second-degree price discrimination. We provide three results. First, with congestion, the firm does not always provide distinct contracts (i.e., it is not always optimal to price discriminate) and it is more likely for the low-valuation buyer to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065228

Precontractual investigation and sequential screening

Terstiege, Stefan - 2013

Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198969

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774

Signaling versus auditing

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2021

characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648090

Selling Reputation When Going out of Business

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2004

Is the reputation of a ﬁrm tradeable when the previous owner has toretire even though ownership change is observable? The authors of this paper consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners, observing only recent proﬁts, bid for the ﬁrms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005850461

Selling reputation when going out of business

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2004

Is the reputation of a firm tradeable when the previous owner has to retire even though ownership change is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners, observing only recent profits, bid for the firms on sale. Customers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261210

Observable Reputation Trading

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2006

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the owner's type, which reflects the quality of the good or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334019

Observable Reputation Trading

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the ownerâ€™s type, which reflects the quality of the good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785913