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Competitive search with private information : can price signal quality?

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2024

have a "market for lemons" with competitive search frictions. In contrast to Akerlof (1970), we prove the existence of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015050844

Competitive search with private information : can price signal quality?

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2024

have a “market for lemons” with competitive search frictions. In contrast to Akerlof (1970), we prove the existence of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015052556

Price competition with information disparities in a vertically differentiated duopoly

Cavaliere, Alberto - 2004

In this paper we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to also consider information disparities about the extent of quality differences. Equilibrium prices turn out to depend not only on the share of informed consumers but also on uninformed consumers beliefs about quality...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600092

Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Cavaliere, Alberto - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072462

Alliances between Competitors and Consumer Information

Garella, Paolo G.; Peitz, Martin - 2007

Alliances between competitors where an established firm provides access to its marketing and distribution channels are an important real-world phenomenon. We analyze a market where an established firm, firm A, produces a product of well-known quality, and a firm with an unknown brand, firm B,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028020

Umbrella branding and external certification

Hakenes, Hendrik (contributor); Peitz, Martin (contributor) - 2008

. -- Umbrella branding ; certification ; signalling …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730661

A model of quality uncertainty with a continuum of quality levels

Gertz, Christopher - 2014 - This version: September 3, 2014

This work takes a closer look on the predominant assumption in usual lemon market models of having finitely many or even only two different levels of quality. We model a situation which is close to the classical monopolistic setting but admits an interval of possible quality values....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403068

Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions, Second Version

Dilme, Francesc - 2013

incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller “rushes-out” by increasing the informativeness of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074026

Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard

Dilme, Francesc - 2012

idiosyncratic choices (actions done by the current owners). We introduce moral hazard in a dynamic signaling model where … refinements to the incorporation of moral hazard in dynamic signaling that implies uniqueness of equilibria. We find that similar … individual characteristics across types of sellers make everyone worse off, since competition increases signaling waste. Also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170975

Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions

Dilme, Francesc - 2014

incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … quality of the asset, depending on the cost structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145542