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The problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the best performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint becomes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989629
This paper investigates the role of variance analysis procedures in aligning objectives under the condition of distorted performance measurement. A riskneutral agency with linear contracts is analyzed, whereby the agent receives postcontract, pre-decision information on his productivity. If the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739659
This paper analyzes the use of alternative performance measures in an agency model in which contracting incorporates both formal and informal agreements. It is shown that under a proper use of verifiable and unverifiable performance measures, the two types of contracts are complements,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005614496
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem which are not easily justified. Taking into account that a performance measure might not be verifiable to a third party, however, a restriction to payments which sum up to a constant may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785798
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency’s total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835207
I analyze the use of alternative performance measures using an agency model that incorporates both formal and informal agreements. I show that under the proper combination of verifiable and unverifiable performance measures, the two types of contract complement each other regardless of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227516
<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>This paper studies the incentive effects of a balanced scorecard within a multitask agency framework under both formal and relational contracts. First, the main characteristics of the balanced scorecard are analyzed with respect to performance measure congruity. It is shown that under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005193911
We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and nonverifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool comprising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702330
The cost minimization problem in an agency model with imperfect monitoring is considered. Under the first order approach, this can be stated as a convex minimization problem with linear inequality and equality constraints in a generally infinite dimensional function space. We apply the Fenchel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759141
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001228652