Similar Search Results

Niedermayer, Andras; Shneyerov, Artyom - 2013

We consider optimal pricing by a profit-maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet and bargain under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a bid-ask spread, can be decentralized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200194

For-Profit Search Platforms

Niedermayer, Andras; Shneyerov, Artyom - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140956

Information Externalities and Intermediaries in Frictional Search Markets

Shi, Xianwen; Siow, Aloysius - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2010

, and sellers incur discrete 'show' costs. This paper studies how intermediaries can help reduce these costs. Intermediaries …. Intermediaries may either be firms that buy goods and hold inventory or brokers who search on behalf of their clients but do not buy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529177

Bargaining with evolving private information

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 885-916

I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation, and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536929

Impossibility of market division with two-sided private information about production costs

Correia-da-Silva, Joao - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto - 2013

In a market with several independent cities, two firms with private information about their production costs decide whether to open a store in each city or restrict their activity to some cities. In cities where a single rm opens a store, this firm is a monopolist. In cities where both firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842593

The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

Palfrey, Thomas R. - Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR), … - 2006

We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player has a privately known "strength" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, there is a conflict; the stronger player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537375

Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns

Ellis, Christopher J.; Groll, Thomas - 2018

We model which special interest groups lobby which policymakers directly, and which employ for-profit intermediaries … policymakers via the promise of a high probability future political access. For-profit intermediaries are always in the … that “insecure” policymakers, those in vulnerable seats, tend to be lobbied by professional intermediaries. Also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011957183