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Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig's Greedy Heuristic
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2009
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963815
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Innovation Contests with Entry Auction
Giebe, Thomas - 2010
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334102
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Innovation contests with entry auction
Giebe, Thomas - 2010
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696
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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - In: Research policy : policy, management and economic … 43 (2014) 1, pp. 179-189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405146
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Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014
The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352
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License auctions with exit (and entry) options : alternative remedies for the exposure problem
Hu, Luke; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2012
Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685869
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2007
profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333797
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333881
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2006
licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333918
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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of … outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556730