Narrow search
Showing 71 - 80 of 684,649
Cover Image
Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2017
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973808
Cover Image
Auctions with Imperfect Commitment When the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung - 2017
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973809
Cover Image
Auctions with Imperfect Commitment When the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059473
Cover Image
Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2014
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
Cover Image
Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2006
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383043
Cover Image
Licensing innovations : the case of the inside patent holder
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2015
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285324
Cover Image
Licensing a Common Value Innovation When Signaling Strength May Backfire
Fan, Cuihong - 2017
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming firms observe imperfect signals of the cost reduction induced by the innovation. The innovator adopts a direct revelation mechanism and awards an unrestricted license to the firm that reports the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973800
Cover Image
Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition
Fan, Cuihong - 2018
sophisticated menu license auctions, and design a dynamic mechanism that is more profitable. In a second step we allow the licensor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932334
Cover Image
The quantitative view of Myerson regularity
Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416003
Cover Image
An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336