Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's...

The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeconomic models based on rational expectations alone. This gap led to a series of recent developments of a behavioral microfoundation of macroeconomics combined with the underlying experimental and...

Offers can increase in the ultimatum game if the recipient can select her proposer, both with non-competitive selection, where the recipient decides whether she wants to play with a single potential proposer, and even more so with competitive selection, where the recipient decides which of two...

In the Ultimatum Game (UG) one player, named “proposer”, has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between herself and a “responder”. If the offer is greater than or equal to the responder’s minimum acceptable offer (MAO), then the money is split as proposed, otherwise,...

Contemporary works, such as Lusk & Hudson's (2004), find that the greater knowledge regarding the possible results of the ultimatum game lead to results closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium. In this paper we seek to further this line of research beyond the fact of making the individuals...

The present paper analyzes the dynamics of bargaining of the ultimatum game in presence of social differences amidst the participants. To that end, two parallel experiments were set-up. One where the social status states of the individuals were of common knowledge (alternative version) and...

This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our...

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...

We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types', and thus distinguish ‘conformists' from...

Social norms in ultimatum's game establish that extremely unequal offers lead to an inevitable failure. However, even under the obedience of the norm and far from Nash Equilibrium, negotiated wealth is traditionally favorable for proposers when information given is temporally incomplete. In our...