We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption …. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable …. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We characterize stable marriage …

that allow us to rationalise both the observed matches and the within-household allocations of time and money. …

We model the interaction between the marriage market and the intrahousehold allocation of resources. We do this within … a setting that accounts for both economic gains to marriage (through public consumption) and unobserved non … the observed matches and the within-household allocations of time and money. …

We present a methodology for the structural empirical analysis of household consumption and time use behaviour under … that allow us to rationalise both the observed matches and the within-household allocations of time and money. …

We present a methodology for the structural empirical analysis of household consumption and time use behaviour under … that allow us to rationalise both the observed matches and the within-household allocations of time and money …

that allow us to rationalise both the observed matches and the within-household allocations of time and money …

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption … patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is … stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption … patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is … stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …