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The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a rich history in Economics and indeed in other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Our research examines free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107187
We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453171
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We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709874
Offers can increase in the ultimatum game if the recipient can select her proposer, both with non-competitive selection, where the recipient decides whether she wants to play with a single potential proposer, and even more so with competitive selection, where the recipient decides which of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162317
We show that allowing communication can increase optimal choices and efficiency in a multi-task, incomplete contracting, principal-agent setting. We study two simple communication protocols, one allowing for one or more requests on non-contractible choices, and the other allowing for a request,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142523
Our study examines the impact of framing of tasks on dictator game choices. We specifically examine the effect of using two different framing of instructions, one of which we deem the charity frame and the other the group frame. The former frames the dictator choice in terms of giving to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105860
We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In the treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game and thus the endowment of the recipient. Across treatment conditions, we alter the mechanism that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211716