Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, ob Vorstandsabfindungen von börsennotierten Unternehmen durch die Empfehlung 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Satz 1 des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex in ihrer Höhe begrenzt werden. Die Analyse umfangreicher empirischer Daten zu Entsprechenserklärungen aller...

The mission of a job does not only affect the type of worker attracted to an organisation, but may also provide incentives to an existing workforce. We conducted a natural field experiment with 267 short-time workers and randomly allocated them to either a prosocial or a commercial job. Our data...

This paper examines how corporate governance reporting corresponds to actual conduct regarding severance payment caps for prematurely departing members of companies' executive boards in Germany. For this purpose, we first evaluate the declarations of conformity for all companies listed in the...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklung der Akzeptanz der Empfehlung G.13 Satz 1 des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (in der Fassung vom 16. Dezember 2019, vormals 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Satz 1), die für vorzeitige Vertragsbeendigungen von Vorstandsmitgliedern Abfindungsobergrenzen vorsieht. Die...

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job charac- teristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence agents' effort....

When two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn,...

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength...